Problem definition: The operational benefits of the Internet of Things (IoT) are predicated on the concept of autonomous sensors deployed by different firms providing real-time knowledge of the state of things. Sensors can improve their estimates by soliciting estimates from other sensors. The choice of which sensors to communicate with ("target") is challenging because sensors (a) are constrained in the number of sensors they can target, and (b) only have partial knowledge of how other sensors operate (e.g., they do not know others' underlying inference algorithms/models). We examine the evolution of inter-firm sensor communication networks, investigate what patterns may emerge, and explore what drives such patterns. Academic/Practical Relevance: The IoT will have a major disruptive impact on operations management (OM), and OM scholars need to develop and examine models and frameworks for analyzing sensor interactions. This is especially important because sensor communication builds ties across firms that require ongoing management. Methodology: Analytic modeling combining estimation, optimization, and dynamic learning. Results: We show that when selecting its target(s) each sensor needs to consider both the quality of the other sensors and its level of trust (i.e., understanding) in their inference models. Importantly, we establish that the state of the environment plays a key role in mediating quality and trust. When sensor qualities are public, we show that each sensor eventually settles on a constant target set but this long run target set is sample-path dependent and varies by sensor. The long run network, however, can be fully defined at time zero as a random directed graph, and hence one can probabilistically predict it. This prediction can be made perfect (i.e., the network can be identified in a deterministic way) after observing the state values for a limited number of periods. When sensor qualities are private, our results reveal that sensors may not settle on a constant target set. Managerial Implications: Our work allows managers to not only predict which other firms their sensors will interact with but to also influence the outcomes through levers such as sensor quality and initial trust. This predictive ability and managerial control is important given that sensor communications build organizational ties that require attention and resources.
Introduction
Industry 4.0 -the marriage of the digital and physical worlds in manufacturing and supply chain systems -has been heralded as offering the "promise of a new industrial revolution" (Deloitte 2019b ) that will have wide ranging implications for operations managers (Lennon Olsen and Tomlin 2019) . Digitization is viewed as an innovative force in operations (Boute and Van Mieghem 2019, Cachon et al. 2019) . The success of Industry 4.0 will rely on the "integration of digital information from many different sources" (Deloitte 2019a, p.1) , and according to some "for a system to be considered Industry 4.0, it must include [among other things] sensors that connect and communicate with one another and decentralized decision making -the ability of cyber-physical systems to make simple decisions on their own and become as autonomous as possible" (Marr 2016 ).
The idea of sharing information across sensors is not a new one, and there exists a large literature on the data architecture, processing, and protocol challenges associated with multi-sensor data fusion (see, e.g., Mitchell 2007) . That literature presupposes a collection of sensors deployed by a single governing entity such that all sensors are willing to share all relevant information; the challenge is to efficiently communicate and aggregate the information. Our work differs significantly in intent and is distinguished by its focus on settings in which autonomous sensors are deployed by different firms in a common environment. Consider the following illustrative examples.
First, complex industrial assets (e.g., turbines, generators, oil platforms, etc.) contain numerous subsystems and, oftentimes, these subsystems are supplied by different firms who take on responsibility for instrumentation and ongoing monitoring of their own subsystem. Asset vibration, for example, might be a relevant variable to numerous subsystems and each will have its own proprietary sensor for measuring this common vibration. Second, for reasons of occupational safety, workers in hazardous sites are increasingly wearing sensors that monitor chemical or other toxin levels. At the same time, it is becoming common for workers from different firms to be deployed in the same industrial site, and therefore sensors from different firms will be functioning in the same environment. Third, many firms are developing minimally-invasive wearable bio-sensors to measure blood glucose levels and it is envisioned that a diabetic person might simultaneously wear multiple sensors (Xiong et al. 2011 ). More broadly the International Electrotechnical Commission reports that systems of sensors, "will not necessarily be owned by one group [and] more often than not, more than one organization will operate in the same system" (IEC 2015, p.33 ).
Based on our industry conversations (one of the authors of this paper works in the IoT division of a leading global technology company), two important aspects to consider in these multi-firm autonomous-sensor settings relate to (a) limitations on communications capacity, and (b) limitations on what information sensors will have about each other. Regarding aspect (a), sensors may be limited in the number of other sensors from which they can request information at any given moment in time due to technical constraints around channel capacity, bandwidth limitations, and energy consumption.
1 Regarding aspect (b), firms may limit the information their sensors can share with other sensors because sensor technologies are often proprietary and closely guarded.
For example, while firms might be willing to share the estimates their sensors generate, they are typically unwilling to share their underlying inference algortithms/models, readings, or other inner 1 Budget considerations can also play a role in limiting the number of sensors each sensor can target, especially if firms in the future charge for sharing information. For example, Terbine is developing a platform that "will act as a broker mediating between those generating data and those wanting to consume it" (Gibbs 2016 ) so as to enable firms to "monetize the IoT/sensor data that [they] are already collecting" (http://terbine.com/what-is-terbine.html).
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workings used to generate the estimates. Similarly, they might not reveal their sensor qualities to other firms.
This partial sharing regime reflects the IoT vision of sensor ecosystems in which participating firms are not direct competitors (in which case they might unwilling to share any information) but might be indirect competitors, either now or in the future, and therefore unwilling to fully share the inner workings of their sensor technologies (e.g., inference algorithms/models, raw readings, measurement approaches, etc.). They may, however, be willing to engage in some limited information sharing to gain some benefit from collaboration. According to a GE Oil & Gas executive discussing sensor communication in operations, firms will engage in partial sharing of sensor-generated information as "they realize they can learn from each other" (Jernigan et al. 2016, p.6) .
In this partial information sharing IoT ecosystem, which other sensors should a sensor target to solicit information from? What communication patterns between sensors (and hence their firms)
will be formed? What drives such patterns? What can firms do influence such patterns? To answer these questions, we develop and analyze a model in which we assume that sensors are willing to share their best estimate of the variable of interest-hereafter referred to as "state"-but will not share their proprietary inference algorithms/models or raw readings used to generate their state estimates. 2 We analyze settings in which they might or might not be willing to share their underlying qualities, i.e., measurement precisions.
Faced with a limit on the number of sensors it can solicit information from, intuition might suggest that a sensor should target the higher quality sensors in its environment. This intuition cannot be applied, however, if sensor qualities are private. Even when sensor qualities are publicly known, we find that this intuition breaks down because sensors are not able to make good use of the estimates they receive from other sensors when they do not know the underlying inference algorithms/models that is used to generate such estimates. Thus, a sensor may prefer to target a lower quality sensor than a higher quality one if it has a better understanding-hereafter "trust"-in the inner workings of the lower quality sensor. Further complicating this tradeoff between quality and trust is the fact that sensors can improve their trust in each other over time if they communicate more often. This makes understanding the communication patterns that takes shape over time a challenging endeavor. In this paper, we take the first steps in addressing this challenge. Our goal is not to examine a highly specific application, but rather to establish and analyze a general framework that may apply to a broad range of emerging settings in the above-mentioned IoT 2 Training is typically done independently by each deploying firm with their own proprietary data sets and algorithms. This results in sensors deployed by different firms having different inference models.
ecosystems.
To this end, we consider a collection of autonomous sensors operating in a common environment that evolves according to an autoregressive time series model. Each sensor is unbiased but imperfect and generates a private, zero-mean noisy signal of the state in each time period. In each period, after observing its own private signal of the state of the environment, each sensor chooses a subset of other sensors to target (i.e., from which sensors to solicit state-of-the-environment estimates) so as to generate an improved state estimate. The updating of the sensor's state estimate depends on (a) its beliefs about the targeted-sensor's inference model, which update over time the more that sensor is targeted, and (b) the qualities of both the targeted and the targeting sensors. We start our analysis by assuming that sensors know the qualities of all other sensors. We then relax the knownquality assumption, and use a robust optimization approach known as percentile optimization to study sensors' robust targeting decisions when they are ambiguous about the qualities of the other sensors. For expositional clarity, we focus on the setting in which a sensor can choose only one target during each period because this is the setting in which choosing the right target is the most important. However, all of our results extend easily to a setting in which multiple simultaneous targets are allowed.
Among other results, we establish that the state of the environment plays a key role in determining the weights placed on quality and trust when selecting a target in any given period. We prove that when qualities are known and asymmetric, each sensor will eventually target a single sensor in all future periods but this long run target can vary by sensor. State dependency means that these long run targets are sample path dependent, and hence, even for each particular sensor, the long run target can vary depending on the realization of state over time. Nevertheless, we demonstrate that the long run communication network that forms between sensors can be fully defined at time zero as a random directed graph, which means that one can probabilistically predict the long-run communication patterns that will emerge. Furthermore, this prediction can be made perfect (i.e., deterministic as apposed to probabilistic) after observing the state values for a limited number of periods. When qualities are not common knowledge, i.e., sensors face ambiguity with respect to other sensor qualities, randomizing across some subset of sensor may be optimal in the long run, but we provide an intuitive sufficient condition under which a deterministic targeting policy is optimal. Put together, our findings shed light on what kind of communication patterns evolve over time, and this allows managers to not only predict which other firms their sensors will interact with but to also influence the communication outcomes through sensor qualities and initial trusts. This predictive ability and managerial control is especially important given that sensor communications build organizational ties that require attention and resources.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The most relevant literature is discussed in §2.
The base model is described in §3. Analysis and results are presented in §4 and §5. The extension to unknown sensor quality is developed and analyzed in §6. A number of other extensions are summarized in §7. Conclusions are discussed in §8. All proofs are provided in the appendix.
Related Studies
Our research is related to a number of streams of literature that examine information sharing for the purpose of improved estimation or forecasting.
Forecasting is a central concern in operations management, and it has long been recognized that combining demand estimates/information from multiple individuals or firms can improve forecast accuracy (e.g., Fisher and Raman 1996 , Swaminathan and Tayur 2003 , Gaur et al. 2007 , Simchi-Levi 2010 . More recently, motivated by the emergence of external and internal prediction markets, Bassamboo et al. (2018) empirically explores the effect of group size on forecast accuracy, finding that aggregation across larger groups improves accuracy. The notion that aggregation of a large number of estimates can improve estimation quality-sometimes described as the "wisdom of crowds"-has also received significant attention in the decision analysis, economics, forecasting, social network, and other literatures (e.g., Bates and Granger 1969 , Ashton and Ashton 1985 , Winkler and Clemen 2004 , Wallis 2011 , Acemoglu et al. 2014a ,b, Atanasov et al. 2016 , Tsoukalas and Falk 2019 . Through that lens, one can view our work as exploring a related but different question: when each individual in the crowd wants to improve his or her own estimate (but cannot ask everyone in the crowd) then who in the crowd should an individual target?
With that lens in mind, the paper most related to our work appears to be Sethi and Yildiz (2016) who examine communications between human experts that independently observe a static white-noise process. In each period, each expert estimates the current state with some randomlydrawn precision (i.e., quality) whose realization is publicly observable to all experts. These human experts may differ in their private opinions on the mean level of the process. Each expert can solicit an estimate from one other expert in each period. The authors examine the types of long run communication networks that can emerge. Although sharing certain features (e.g., target selection must tradeoff between quality and unknown beliefs), our work differs significantly from Sethi and Yildiz (2016) in some fundamental aspects that are driven by our IoT-sensor motivating context. For example, we consider a dynamic (not static) environment because that is a typical feature of the environments in which sensors are deployed. We establish the importance of this distinction by proving that-different to a static random environment-the state and its dynamics are a crucial driver of target selection. Furthermore, the human experts' qualities are randomly redrawn in every period in Sethi and Yildiz (2016) , with realizations being common knowledge. This highlights two other critical differences in our work driven by the IoT context: sensor qualities are not typically random and, more importantly, sensor qualities may not be known to other sensors.
To accommodate this unknown-quality reality, we adopt a robust optimization framework in which sensor qualities are ambiguous and target selection needs to be robust to this ambiguity.
Multi-sensor data fusion, defined by Mitchell (2007)[p.3.] as "the theory, techniques and tools which are used for combining sensor data, or data derived from sensory data, into a common representational format ... so that it is, in some sense, better than would be possible if the data sources were used individually," emerged as a problem domain in the 1990s due to the U.S. military's desire to enable more-complete or higher quality surveillance of geographic areas. It has since grown to encompass diverse applications in artificial intelligence, robotics, and environmental, equipment and health monitoring (Hall and Llinas 1997) . Sensor fusion is typically focused on developing efficient and effective architectures and data processing techniques (Hall and Llinas 1997 , Mitchell 2007 , Khaleghi et al. 2013 , Hall and Llinas 1997 for sharing across a given network of sensors, whereas our paper, motivated by the autonomous nature of sensors in the IoT, explores the question of which subset of other firms' sensors any given sensor should target.
Our work is also related to the general theory of robust optimization and estimation; relevant papers from the operations literature include Liyanage and Shanthikumar (2005) , Perakis and Roels (2008) , Delage and Iancu (2015) , Saghafian and Tomlin (2016) , Mišić and Perakis (2019) , and references therein. For some general theoretical results on the percentile optimization approach that we utilize, we refer interested readers to Nemirovski and Shapiro (2006) , Delage and Mannor (2010) , Bren and Saghafian (2019) , and references therein.
The Model
We first present a high level description before formalizing the model. We consider a dynamic setting in which a collection of autonomous sensor-devices operate in a common environment.
In the IoT (as in almost all senor applications), sensors provide a state estimate to a device (or controller) that takes action based on this estimate. The objective of the sensor in the sensor-device dyad is to provide a good estimate to the device which then takes the best action based on that estimate. We purposefully consider only the sensor part of this dyad (not the device) and assume that the objective of each sensor is to generate the most accurate state estimate it can for its associated device. We intentionally do not model the device action problem because there is a wide class of action problems for which the goal of the sensor should be to provide its device with its best state estimate. Our model is therefore quite general and indifferent to the device actions so long as actions benefit from higher-quality state information.
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We focus on the sensor part of this sensor-device dyad and explore the communication problem of determining for each sensor (in each period) from which other sensor(s) it should request information so as to most improve the accuracy of its own state estimate. As discussed in the introduction, we consider a partial-information sharing regime in which the sensor-owning entities are willing to share some but not all information. In particular, sensors are willing to share their current state estimate and possibly their underlying sensor quality but not their proprietary inference algorithm/model or reading.
In what follows, we formally describe the environment, individual sensor measurement and state estimation, sensor collaboration, and finally the target selection problem whereby each sensor chooses from which other sensors to solicit state estimates.
Environment: A collection N {1, 2, · · · , N } of autonomous sensors operates in a common environment that is defined by a state variable S ∈ R whose discrete-time evolution is governed by a first-order autoregressive process (AR(1)):
for t = 1, 2, · · · , ∞, where˜ t are i.i.d. normal white-noise random variables with mean 0 and variance normalized to 1. We adopt an AR(1) model as the most parsimonious one that allows the environment to exhibit autoregressive behavior, a common feature in many situations.
Individual Sensor Measurement and State Estimation: At the beginning of each time period t, each sensor i ∈ N privately generates a noisy signal (observation) Γ it of the state variable S t .
In many IoT settings (e.g., when the variable-of-interest is difficult or time-consuming to measure), this signal is indirectly generated by measuring some other related properties and mapping these measurements into the variable-of-interest. Different sensor technologies may rely on different indirect properties, and hence, different mappings. To avoid unnecessary notational burden, we suppress the raw readings and related mapping, and instead focus on the final noisy signal of the current state (S t ) privately derived by sensor i:
where it are i.i.d. normal white noises with mean 0 and variance 1/(q i ) 2 , with q i representing the quality of sensor i. That is, a higher quality sensor has a higher precision. Each sensor i ∈ N knows that the environment evolves according to an AR(1) process but does not know the true parameters of the AR(1) process. Specifically, when using its signal to estimate the current state of the environment, sensor i uses its own inference model-developed based on its firms's training algorithms and data sets prior to deployment-which is given by
whereα i andβ i are sensor i's estimates of the process parameters α and β. Immediately before period t starts, the realized value of the previous period state s t−1 becomes publicly known, i.e., is revealed to each sensor, and the system moves to the next period. 4 Our analysis and findings immediately extends to a setting in which state realization occurs less frequently (e.g., every T > 1 periods) but target selection remains constant between realizations; this only requires a re-scaling of time, i.e., changing the definition of a period.
At the beginning of each period t, knowing the realization of the previous period state s t−1 , but prior to receiving the noisy signal Γ it , sensor i believes (based on its inference model (3)) that the current state S t follows a normal distribution with meanα i +β i s t−1 and variance 1. Upon realizing the current signal Γ it = γ it , sensor i updates its prior belief about the current state according to Bayes' rule. Since both the signal received about the state and the prior on state have a normal distribution (see (2) and (3)), it follows from Bayes' rule that sensor i's posterior belief about the state is also normally distributed but with a mean and variance given by
and
respectively, where S it represents sensor i's signal-updated belief (distribution) about the current state S t . The higher the quality of sensor i, the more weight it places on its signal when updating its mean belief, and the larger the associated variance reduction.
Information Sharing and Sensor Collaboration: Each sensor i ∈ N is aware of all the other sensors in the environment. All sensors in the collection N are willing to collaborate in the following manner: in each period t, after all sensors have formed updated beliefs based on their private signals (according to (4) and (5) above), any sensor j ∈ N is willing to share its best estimate of state (according to the expected value of the squared error loss) which is its updated mean prediction of state E[S jt |Γ jt = γ jt ] with any other sensor i that requests it. 5 Sensors are deployed by different firms, and therefore sensor i ∈ N \ {j} may not know the inference model parameterŝ α j andβ j used by sensor j because firms typically train their sensors (pre-deployment) differently using different algorithms and training data sets that are often privately owned. We assume that at time t = 0 sensor i believes that sensor j's inference model parametersα j andβ j come from Target Selection: In each period t, after updating its state estimate based on its private signal as in (4) and (5) above, each sensor i chooses a set of sensors from which to request state estimates, i.e., their updated mean beliefs about the state. We do not model the actions of devices associated with sensors but implicitly assume that the action payoff is increasing in the quality of the state estimate. Thus, in choosing which sensors to target, sensor i selects those sensors that will most improve its own estimate. By most improvement, we mean that sensor i's resulting updated state distribution gives the lowest expected squared error of estimation. 7 In particular, sensor i's decision in each period t is based on the following optimization problem:
Our work easily extends to a setting in which j will only collaborate with some subset of N .
6 The extension of our analyses to a setting in which the mean of these normal distributions is not correct is relatively straightforward.
7 As we will show, this implies that each sensor targets those sensors that provide it with the most information about the state. We use the expected value of the squared error as our targeting objective function mainly because it is a common loss function used in the literature of Machine Learning and Estimation Theory. However, all our results hold for any targeting objective function that is strictly increasing in the expected squared error of estimation.
where the vector a it ∈ {0, 1} n−1 is composed of elements a ijt with a ijt = 1 if i targets j at time t,
is the posterior distribution of sensor i's belief about the state after communicating with the selected targets at time t, c is the cost of communication per target in each period, and b is a communication budget in each period. We define k = b/c, and refer to it as the targeting channel capacity because k represents the maximum number of targets from which a sensor can solicit estimates in a period. For expositional ease, we focus on the case where a sensor can choose only one target during each period, i.e., k = 1, because this is when choosing the right target is most important. Our results readily extend to the case of k > 1 as we will discuss in the next section.
Extensions: We also explore three key extensions to the setting described above: (i) we relax the assumption that the state of the previous period is realized at the beginning of the next period and we analyze scenarios with a general finite delay in state realization as well as scenarios without any state realization; (ii) we analyze an extension to nonmyopic sensors that care about estimation quality in future periods; and (iii) we relax the assumption that each sensor's inference model parametersα i andβ i remain constant over time and we consider a setting in which sensors update their own inference models in a Bayesian fashion. These extensions and results are summarized in §7 but we relegate their detailed analysis and discussion to the appendices for brevity.
Preliminaries: Targeting Equivalence and Trust Dynamics
As a preliminary to our exploration of how sensor communications evolve over time, we first develop an equivalent target-selection problem and analyze how any given sensor's beliefs about other sensors' parameters update from one period to the next.
Targeting Equivalence: We begin by establishing that the target selection problem in (6) above is equivalent to one in which sensor i selects as its target the sensor that provides i with the most informative signal about the current state, where a less noisy signal (i.e., one with a lower variance) is more informative. 8 Importantly, we will show that the informativeness of a signal depends not only on the quality of the potential target sensor j, but also on the receiving sensor i's trust in sensor j's inference model. In particular, given its privately generated signal Γ jt in period t, sensor j provides sensor i with its best current estimate of state, which is E[S jt |Γ jt ], i.e., its updated/latest expected belief about the current state S t . Now, from sensor i's perspective, E[S jt |Γ jt ] is formed according to:
which is similar to (4) but whereα ijt andβ ijt reflect sensor i's beliefs at time t about sensor j's inference parametersα j andβ j . (The relevant dynamic updating mechanism is developed below.)
Because Γ jt = S t + jt from (2), this value E[S ijt |Γ jt ] provides sensor i with the following noisy signal regarding the state S t :
We denote the variance in this signal's noise as:
There are two independent sources of noise in this signal: (a) the inherent white noise jt in sensor j's measurement Γ jt (which has a variance of 1/q 2 j ), and (b) the noise caused by sensor i's lack of trust in sensor j's inference model. For notational convenience, we define the random variable Ξ ijt (s t−1 ) =α ijt +β ijt s t−1 , where its dependence on the prior state value s t−1 is explicitly noted.
Defining the precision ψ ijt (s t−1 ) 1/V ar Ξ ijt (s t−1 ) , it follows from (9) that
Under a variance reduction objective, sensor i's target in period t is
The following result establishes that the original target selection problem in (6) is equivalent to the variance reduction target selection (11); that is, both objectives result in the same target.
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Proposition 1 (Target Selection and Variance Reduction). If channel capacity k = 1, then under (6), a * ijt = 1 1 {j=j * it } , where j * it is given by (11), and 1 1 {·} is the indicator function.
This result readily extends to a general channel capacity k ≥ 2: each sensor i will select the k other sensors that provide the lowest variance of signal. That is, it chooses the k most-informative sensors (from its perspective) and solicits their state estimates.
Recall that, by definition, the variance of the random variable Ξ ijt (s t−1 ) =α ijt +β ijt s t−1 is given by 1/ψ ijt (s t−1 ). In what follows, we therefore refer to ψ ijt (s) as the trust function that sensor i has for sensor j at time t, and we refer to ψ ijt (s t−1 ) as the trust value, i.e., the trust function evaluated at the latest realized state s = s t−1 . We use the term trust to convey the notion that higher values imply less noise in sensor i's beliefs about sensor j's underlying inference model. Importantly, as we will establish below, sensor i does not need to separately update its beliefs over time about parametersα ijt andβ ijt of sensor j's inference model; it suffices to update the trust function ψ ijt (s).
Trust Dynamics: To operationalize the target selection problem (11), we now examine how any given sensor's trust function with respect to some other sensor evolves over time. In particular, we develop the mechanism through which the time-t trust function is updated to that at time t + 1, i.e., how ψ ijt (s) updates to ψ ij,t+1 (s). To that end, we first note that it follows from the definition
) that the initial trust function is given by
We also note that, if sensor i communicates with sensor j at time t, then it follows from (7) that i receives the following signal about the random variable Ξ ijt (s t−1 ) =α ijt +β ijt s t−1 :
There are two independent sources of noise in this signal: (a) the noise in sensor i's own estimate of the current state S t , which has variance of 1/(1 + q 2 i ) (see (5)), and (b) the inherent white noise jt in sensor j measurement, which has a variance of 1/q 2 j . Thus, based on (13), the variance in the signal's noise is given by V ar[q
Using Bayesian updating of the aggregated univariate random variable Ξ ijt (s t−1 ) after observing this signal, which eliminates the need to explicitly update and carry over the joint distribution ofα ijt andβ ijt (hence, their covariance matrix), we can show the following result.
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Proposition 2 (Trust Dynamics). For any s ∈ R:
(ii) For all t = 1, 2, 3, · · · , we have
10 We also provide a second proof of this result in which we explicitly use the joint distribution ofαijt andβijt and characterize how their covariance matrix is updated over time (see Appendix A).
Intuitively, sensor i's trust function for sensor j changes from time t to time t + 1 if, and only if, i targets j at time t, i.e., a ijt = 1. Moreover, if i targets j then the gain in i's trust in j does not depend on the state: the gain is given by f (q i , q j ), which we refer to as the stickiness factor. It is noteworthy, however, that the gain depends on both the sender's (j's) and the receiver's (i's)
qualities. More importantly, it follows from (15) that to calculate the current trust function that sensor i has for sensor j we only need to know the number of times that i selected j as its target;
we do not need to know in which periods those selections occurred.
Communication Networks: Who Targets Who?
With the equivalent target selection problem and trust dynamics developed, we now characterize how target selection evolves over time. In choosing a target in period t, any given sensor i needs to consider both the quality of each other sensor j and its own current trust value ψ ijt (s t−1 ) for each sensor j; see the targeting criterion (11). That is, beside quality, the attractiveness of j as a potential target for i depends on the trust value ψ ijt (s t−1 ). The trust value, in turn, depends explicitly on the previous state s t−1 but also implicity on all prior states through their influence on prior targeting of sensor j by sensor i. Thus, target selection in each period depends on the history of state realizations up to that period. 
Initial Target Selection
It is informative to first consider target selection at time t = 1, because this initial selection highlights a key ongoing tradeoff between sensor qualities and state value. Consider any given sensor i, and assume (without loss of generality) that it can select its target from two sensors: a high-quality sensor (labeled h) and a lower quality sensor (labeled l). When should sensor i target sensor h?
When should it target sensor l? How does the choice depend on the initial state s 0 ?
To answer these questions, let r q l /q h denote the quality ratio of sensors l and h. By definition, 0 < r ≤ 1. Using (11) and (12), it follows that sensor i strictly prefers targeting the lower quality sensor (l) if, and only if,
11 This state dependency does not arise if the underlying environment is governed by a static i.i.d. white noise process, i.e., when β = 0. In that case, it follows directly from the above analysis that the trust function ψ ij,t+1 (s) = v
aijt. This is independent of the state s, and therefore, target selection is sample path independent. From this perspective, one can view Proposition 2 as generalizing the belief updating expressions (7)-(9) in Sethi and Yildiz (2016) to the case of an AR(1) process.
where 1/v 2 ij0 and 1/w 2 ij0 are sensor i's initial belief variances about sensor j ∈ {h, l} parametersα j andβ j respectively. From (16), it can be seen that i strictly prefers to target l if, and only if,
where
We note that c 0 reflects a tension between the difference in sensor qualities and the differences in i's initial trust about inference model parametersα h andα l . Similarly, c 1 reflects a tension between the difference in sensor qualities and the differences in i's initial trust about the inference model parametersβ h andβ l . As (17) shows, state influences initial target selection, and this is through the c 1 term. The following result presents the conditions under which sensor i strictly prefers to target the lower quality sensor. Thus, it also sheds light on conditions under which sensor i prefers to sacrifice quality for trust. By an appropriate swapping of labels l and h, it can also be used to highlight conditions under which sensor i strictly prefers to target the higher quality sensor. This proposition highlights the interconnected roles that (a) sensor qualities, (b) trusts, and (c) state play in target selection. Intuitively, if sensor i has more trust in its beliefs about the highquality sensor's inference model parameters (i.e., v ih0 ≥ v il0 and w ih0 ≥ w il0 ), then the high-quality sensor is the inherently more attractive target regardless of state. This is reflected in the above proposition by the fact that c 0 < 0 and c 1 < 0 in this case and, therefore, sensor h is preferred. On the other hand, if sensor i has more trust in its beliefs about at least one of the low-quality sensor's inference parameters, then the high-quality sensor might not be the preferred target, because its estimate may prove to be more noisy from i's perspective (than the low-quality sensor). This tradeoff between quality and trust depends on the state (parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3) unless the trust advantage of the lower quality sensor compared to the higher quality one is so large that it Article submitted to ; manuscript no. makes the lower quality sensor the preferred target regardless of the state (part (iii) of Proposition 3).
As the quality ratio r increases from 0 to 1 (all else held constant) there are at most three distinct regions of target selection that identify the role of state, as illustrated in Figure 1 .
12 When the quality ratio r is low, i.e., sensor h is of much higher quality than l, then h dominates l, i.e.,
h is targeted in all states. This h-dominating region always exists, but it does not cover the entire range 0 < r ≤ 1 unless v ih0 ≥ v il0 and w ih0 ≥ w il0 , i.e., the high quality sensor is more trusted for both parameters. In contrast, when the quality ratio is high, i.e., sensor qualities relatively similar, then l dominates h, i.e., l is targeted in all states. This l-dominating region exists if, and only if, v ih0 < v il0 and w ih0 < w il0 , i.e., the low quality sensor is more trusted for both parameters.
Importantly, there is an intermediate range of the quality ratio r (that extends to r = 1 if the trust ranking differs across v and w) in which state matters and the indifference curve |s 0 | = −c 0 /c 1 completely characterizes target selection. Figure 1 illustrates an instance with parameters for which Proposition 3(i) applies. In this case, a high absolute value of state induces sensor i to emphasize trust over quality such that it targets sensor l. In contrast, when the absolute value of state is low, quality matters more than trust, and i targets h. In the next section, we now turn our attention to exploring how target selection evolves over time.
Target Evolution and Long Run Target Selection
Analogously to initial selection, when choosing its target in period t, any given sensor i needs to consider the quality of each sensor j ∈ N \ {i} as well as its current trust value ψ ijt (s t−1 ) in that sensor j. What differs from the initial selection is that the trust function ψ ijt (s) may have evolved due to past targeting of j by i. As shown in Proposition 2, this trust function still depends on the initial belief variances 1/v ij0 and 1/w ij0 but it now also depends on (a) i's communication history with j as reflected by the number of times i targeted j in the past, and (b) the stickiness factor f (q i , q j ). In particular, ψ ijt (s t−1 ) strictly increases in the number of times i has already targeted j, and so the attractiveness of j as a future target for i increases every time i targets j. This is because the signal received from j becomes more informative for i as its trust in j builds.
The stickiness factor f (q i , q j ) determines the gain in trust that results each time i targets j. It is strictly increasing in q i and strictly decreasing in q j ; see (14) . This has two implications worth noting. First, all else equal, if two sensors i h and i l with q i h > q i l both target some other sensor j then the resulting gain in trust in j is higher for i h than for i l . In other words, higher quality sensors can build trust in other sensors more rapidly than can lower quality sensors. Second, all else equal, if two sensors j h and j l with q j h > q j l are potential targets for some other sensor i, then i's potential gain in trust is lower for i h than for i l . Put differently, lower quality sensors result in larger trust gains if targeted.
To analyze how target selection evolves over time, it is helpful to introduce the following definition and result.
Definition 1 (Dominance). For two sensors m, n ∈ N \ {i}, we say that m dominates n at time t from the perspective of sensor i (denoted by m it n), if P r σ 2 t (i, m, S t−1 ) ≤ σ 2 t (i, n, S t−1 )|H t = 1, where H t is the history of communications up to time t (H 1 = ∅).
In other words, m it n if sensor i almost surely prefers to target sensor m instead of n at time t given the history of all past communications. Using Definition 1, we can establish the following preservation result.
Lemma 1 (Dominance Preservation). If m it n, then m it n, for all t > t.
This result establishes that dominance is preserved (i.e., persists) over time. Therefore, if some sensor n becomes dominated by some other sensor m from the perspective of i at some time t, then sensor n will never be targeted by i in the future. This allows sensor i to reduce its set of potential In what follows, we first consider two special cases, and then explore the general case.
Special Case 1 (Common Initial Trusts that Vary by Sensor):
Consider the case in which any given sensor i has a common initial trust in all other sensors j ∈ N \ {i}, i.e., v ij0 = v i0 and w ij0 = w i0 for all j. This common initial trust can vary by sensor i. Let h(i) denote the highestquality sensor j ∈ N \ {i} from i's perspective. It follows from Proposition 3 that h(i) dominates all other sensors (from the perspective of i) at time 1. Because dominance is preserved (Lemma 1), the communication network at any time (including the long run) is the same across all sample paths: regardless of state realizations, each sensor i always targets the highest quality sensor available h(i). Put differently, the highest-quality sensor targets the second-highest quality sensor, and all other sensors target the highest quality sensor.
Special Case 2 (Equal Qualities with Initially More Trusted Sensors):
Consider the case in which (a) the sensors are all of the same quality, and (b) for any given sensor i there exists some other sensorĵ(i) such that v iĵ0 ≥ v ij0 and w iĵ0 ≥ w ij0 for all j ∈ N \ {i}. In other words, sensor i has higher initial trusts in both ofĵ(i)'s inference model parameters than in any other sensor's parameters. It follows from part (iii) of Proposition 3 thatĵ(i) dominates all other sensors (from the perspective of i) at time 1. Because dominance is preserved (Lemma 1), the communication network at any time (including the long run) is the same across all sample paths: regardless of state realizations, each sensor i always targets its initially most-trusted sensorĵ(i).
In general, however, sensors may differ in their qualities and any given sensor may have heterogenous trusts in other sensors. In such a setting, an initially-dominant target (for any given sensor) may not exist. Therefore, we next develop results to help analyze this general case. To this end, let S ∞ {s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , · · · } denote a long run sample path, i.e., the realization of states over an infinite horizon. Similarly, we denote by S t {s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s t } a finite sample path up to time t. We also let S t ∞ denote a sample path that is equivalent to S ∞ up to time t, but one which may deviate from S ∞ afterwards: S t ∞ S t ∪ {s t+1 , s t+2 , · · · }. To examine the long run networks that may arise, we first introduce the following definition.
Definition 2 (Long Run Trustees). Given a sample path S ∞ , the set of long run trustees of sensor i is:
Remark 1 (Infinitely-Often Communication). It immediately follows from (15) that, along any sample path S ∞ , sensor i targets sensor j infinitely often if, and only if, j ∈ T i (S ∞ ).
If two (or more) sensors have the same quality, then depending on the initial trust of some sensor i in these equal-quality sensors, there might exist some sample paths along which the long run set of trustees of sensor i includes more than one sensor and sensor i keeps alternating between the sensors in its long run set of trustees such that it targets each of them infinitely often along the sample path. This alternating behavior is caused by the value of state in each period which, as noted earlier, plays a central role in target selection.
However, when qualities differ across sensors, we establish in what follows that for any given sensor i and along any fixed sample path S ∞ : (a) T i (S ∞ ) is a singleton, i.e., |T i (S ∞ )| = 1, and (b) the unique long run trustee in T i (S ∞ ) can be identified in the almost sure sense in finite time,
These two results in turn will allow us to establish the following. At time zero, one can fully define the long run communication network as a random directed graph, i.e., a directed graph with given probabilities assigned to each link ij that indicate the probability that j will be the long run target for i. Furthermore, there exists a finite time after which the graph can be defined as a deterministic directed graph, i.e., with all probabilities being zero or one, that fully specifies the long run target for each sensor.
To establish these results, we start by presenting the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For any > 0, there exists a fixed thresholdψ ∈ R such that if ψ ijt (s t−1 ) >ψ and
The above lemma states that a sensor j will not be targeted by a sensor i if (a) there is another sensor j of a higher quality than j , and (b) sensor i's trust in j reaches a fixed threshold. The importance of this result lies in the fact that the threshold is a fixed number, and hence, is independent of sensor i's trust level in sensor j . Thus, the above lemma holds regardless of how much i trusts j at time t: if i's trust in j passes the fixed threshold, then j will not be targeted by i.
This in turn allows us to show that, when sensor qualities are asymmetric (defined below), the set of long run trustees of each sensor i along any sample path S ∞ only includes one sensor.
Definition 3 (Asymmetric Qualities). Sensor qualities are said to be asymmetric if, and only if, q j = q j for all j, j ∈ N with j = j . It is noteworthy that although the long run set of trustees of each sensor i has a unique member (when sensor qualities are asymmetric), this unique member is (a) sample path dependent, and (b) is not necessarily the highest quality sensor in N \ {i}. As Proposition 3 showed, at t = 1 any given sensor i might target a sensor of lower quality than some other potential target. Due to the stickiness factor introduced in Proposition 2, this may create a momentum for sensor i to target the same sensor in future periods as well. This may result in a lower quality sensor dominating the higher quality sensor from the perspective of sensor i at some period t. Since dominance persists (see Lemma 1), the higher quality sensor may not be the long run trustee of sensor i.
Using the above result, we next show that when the sensor qualities are asymmetric, the long run set of trustees of each sensor can be determined in finite time. That is, transient analysis is sufficient for characterizing the communication network that will be formed in the long run. This is because the role of state in target selection eventually vanishes, i.e., the effect of past targeting outweighs the role of state.
Proposition 5 (Transient Analysis). If sensor qualities are asymmetric, then along any sample path S ∞ there exists a finite period t * such that for all i ∈ N
The above results allow us to characterize the long run network of communications.
13 First, at time zero, this network can be viewed as a random directed graph G(N , E, P), where N (i.e., the set of sensors) is the set of vertices, E {(i, j) : i, j ∈ N } is the set of directed links, and P is a set of probability distributions that assign to link (i, j) probability p ij defined as
Second, as the following result shows, the network can be defined as a deterministic directed graph after some finite time.
Proposition 6 (Deterministic Random Directed Graph). If sensor qualities are asymmetric, then there exists a finite time tcommunication network can be defined as G(N , E, P) introduced above with the additional property that p ij ∈ {0, 1} for all i, j ∈ N .
As noted earlier, all of the above results extend readily to a setting in which a sensor can simultaneously target k > 1 other sensors. The long run trustee set of each sensor will, however, contain min{ k , |N | − 1} sensors.
Drivers of the Communication Network
As discussed in the introduction, inter-firm sensor communication leads to relationships that require managerial attention and resources. Therefore, it is important that managers not only be able to predict the communication network (which is possible from Proposition 6) but understand what drives the network pattern and therefore what can be done to influence the pattern. There are three key drivers in our framing: state dynamics, sensor qualities, and initial trusts in beliefs about other sensors' inference models. We first consider state dynamics, which is not controllable by firms. We then consider qualities and trusts, drivers over which firms may have some control.
State Dynamics
We present the results of two numerical studies that examine, respectively, the roles that the underlying state dynamics and the initial state distribution play in long run communication network formation. In both studies, for ease of illustration, we consider a collection of three sensors, i.e., N = {1, 2, 3}. The following sensor characteristics are adopted for each study. Sensor qualities are asymmetric and decreasing in sensor labels, with q (q j : j ∈ N ) = (9.8, 9.6., 9.4). The initial trusts v ij0 and w ij0 are specified by the following matrix:
Thus, any two different sensors i and k have the same initial trusts about the third sensor j.
This matrix also implies that initial trusts are increasing in sensor labels. Combined with the above quality-labeling scheme, it then follows that sensor 1 is the most attractive from a quality perspective but that sensor 3 is the most attractive from an initial trust perspective. Sensor 2 lies in between sensors 1 and 3 in that it represents mid values of both quality and trust. We emphasize that by design these parameters ensure that no sensor is initially dominant from the perspective of any other sensor. Also, these parameters ensure that target selection in the initial period is given by Proposition 3 (i); that is, the intermediate region of Figure 1 applies and so high (absolute) state values favor trust over quality.
Article submitted to ; manuscript no. The role of state dynamics.
For each problem instance in each study, the time-0 random directed graph G(N , E, P) was generated by simulating 1, 000 sample paths, each representing a distinct realization of the underlying AR(1) process over time. That is, at time t = 0, the probability that j will be the eventual long run target of i (see p ij defined in (21)) is estimated using the outcomes of the 1, 000 sample paths.
14 Study 1 (The Effect of State Dynamics): To capture the effect of state dynamics, we consider nine different cases for the environment's AR(1) parameters (α, β). The nine cases represent pairwise combinations of low, medium, and high values of both α and β: α ∈ {0, 2, 4} and β ∈ {0.3, 0.5, 0.7}. The initial state is randomly drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of 10 and a standard deviation of 2 in all cases. Figure 2 presents the long run communication networks for all nine cases of (α, β). Recall that by design no sensor is dominant from the perspective of any other sensor. Despite this fact, observe in the top left panel (low α and low β) that the long run trustee of each sensor is always the 14 The number of simulated sample paths were chosen so that the point estimations for pij values have a low enough standard error, and hence, provide reliable estimation.
high-quality sensor, i.e., 1 eventually always targets 2, and 2 and 3 eventually always target 1. Also, observe in bottom right panel (high α and high β) that the long run trustee of each sensor is always the high-trust sensor, i.e., 1 and 2 target 3, and 3 targets 2. In contrast, at intermediate values of α and β, e.g., the center panel, the long run trustee of each sensor typically depends on the sample path: for some sample paths, the higher quality sensor wins and for others the higher-trust sensor wins. However, we observe that the winner is more likely to be the higher-trusted sensor as either α and β increases. The reason for this (α, β) effect is twofold. One, high state values favor higher trusted targets because Proposition 3 (i) applies (by study design). Two, higher state values are more likely to occur on any given sample path as either α or β increases. Therefore, higher-trust sensors are increasingly favored as α and/or β increases. Interestingly, we also note that α typically has a stronger effect than β.
15
Study 2 (The Effect of Initial State): We now fix the environment's AR(1) parameters as (α, β) = (2, 0.5) and consider three different N (µ, σ) distributions for the initial state: (a) (µ, σ) = (2, 2); (b) (µ, σ) = (10, 2), and (c) (µ, σ) = (18, 2). We know from our earlier theoretical results that the initial state can impact the long run trustee probability through its impact on initial selection and the resulting trust gain. That is, due to the stickiness factor, initial state can create a momentum that might last for ever.
The long run communication (targeting) network for each case is presented in Figure 3 . Observe that as we move from left to right, i.e., from case (a) to (b) to (c), sensors 2 and 3 settle on their higher-trust sensor (3 for 2; 2 for 3) with a somewhat higher probability. This reflects the fact that higher initial states favor initial selection of the higher-trusted sensor and higher initial states are more likely as we move from (a) to (b) to (c). For sensor 1, although there is a higher probability of the more-trusted sensor being initially targeted as we move from case (a) to (b) to (c), this has no effect on the long run trustee probability because quality eventually wins over initial trust in all sample paths.
In summary, the initial state can impact the long run trustee probability through its impact on initial selection and the resulting trust gain. However, in comparing Study 1 and Study 2, we observe that the effect of the initial state is less strong than the effect of the underlying state dynamics, i.e., the (α, β) parameters. This is because the (α, β) parameters influence the state realization in every period, whereas the initial state's impact on future states can diminish over time.
Article submitted to ; manuscript no. The role of initial state in long run communication network. S 0 has a N (µ, σ) distribution.
Quality and Trust
Although firms may not be able to affect the environment's state dynamics, they can exert some control over sensor quality through technology development and selection and they can affect initial trusts through formal alliances or informal collaborations across firms.
Looking first at the quality lever, it follows from our earlier analysis that at time t = 0 the probability that some sensor j will be the long run trustee of some other sensor i increases in the quality of senor j; that is, p ij , defined in (21), increases in q j . This then implies that firms deploying high-quality sensors are more likely to be the long-run trustee of other firms' sensors, and therefore to be more connected to other firms (i.e., be a central node). As discussed in the introduction, such connections build organizational relationships that require resources and attention, and so firms deploying high quality sensors should anticipate the opportunities and consequences of being more central in IOT-enabled networks. Although beyond the scope of this particular research, this raises the interesting possibility of sensor-quality based pricing for information sharing to enable firms to monetize the value of having higher-quality sensors.
Firms that utilize high-quality sensors also have another advantage: they can build trust in other firms' sensors more rapidly (see, e.g., the discussion prior to Definition 1). This offers two main benefits to such firms: (a) they can make use of the information they receive from other firms (as a tool to improve their sensor's estimate) in a faster way, and (b) direct less resources at improving their initial trust to other firms. This latter benefit means that firms should consider investments in quality improvement as substitutes for some of their pre-deployment activates that allows them to build initial trust.
Turning to the trust lever, the long-run probability p ij , defined in (21), increases in v ij0 and w ij0 ; that is, all else equal, sensor j is more likely to the long run trustee of sensor i as i's initial trust (belief precision) in j increases. Therefore, a firm that desires more centrality, in the sense of being targeted by more firms, can choose to be more revealing about its inference model, at least to those other firms with which it is more interested in fostering and maintaining relationships.
All else equal, firms that are more willing to promote initial trusts in each others' sensors are more likely to end up as each others targets, and so firms in existing alliances may find that those relationships persist. Initial trusts may also be enhanced through past exposure to firms in different environments. If firm i has experience targeting sensors from firm j in analogous environments previously then its initial trust in j in this new environment should be higher, making it more likely that j will be the long run trustee. In this way, past targeting relationships may promote future relationships and create opportunities for alliances that were not initially planned.
Sensors of Unknown Qualities
To this point, we have assumed that sensor qualities are common knowledge. That might not always be the case; a sensor deployed by one firm may have only limited knowledge about the quality of a sensor deployed by a different firm.
In what follows, we allow sensor qualities to be ambiguous to other sensors. We do so by assuming that any given sensor i believes the quality of sensor j ∈ N \ {i} is contained in a set of possible values (which we refer to as the ambiguity set) with each possible value having some associated probability. We adopt a robust optimization framework in which sensors select their target so as to be robust to this ambiguity, while trying to achieve the best possible improvement in their estimation as in the previous sections. To this end, let P Q i denote the joint probability that sensor i assigns to the possible qualities of all other sensors. We consider a robust version of the target selection problem (6), where similar to the previous sections we assume k = 1 for expositional ease. In each time period t, any given sensor i follows a targeting strategy that is defined by a |N | − 1 dimensional probability vector with elements representing the probability that sensor i targets sensor j ∈ N \ {i}. In particular, we assume sensor i's problem at time t is to find the targeting strategy:
s.t.
That is, at time t each sensor i optimizes over the set of targeting strategies Π i (which contains all deterministic and/or randomized strategies) to find the current targeting strategy that minimizes y π it , where y π it represents the robust "cost" of a targeting strategy π. This cost is defined as the (1− )-percentile (with respect to P Q i ) of the sensor i's estimation squared error if it follows targeting strategy π. In (25), F π it is the posterior distribution of sensor i's belief about the state after applying the targeting strategy π at time t.
16 Parameter ∈ [0, 1] represents the level of optimism, where = 0 yields robust optimization with respect to the worst-case (a pessimistic scenario), and = 1 yields robust optimization with respect to the best-case (an optimistic scenario).
The optimal targeting strategy given by (23) need not be deterministic in general: a randomized strategy might outperform any deterministic strategy due to the chance constrained optimization nature of problem (23)- (25). This is formalized in Lemma EC.2 in Appendix B. As we will see in our numerical studies below, this randomization may cause a sensor to have a long run set of trustees that includes more than one member even if qualities are asymmetric, which is in stark contrast to the singleton result we established when qualities are known (Proposition 4). That is, in order to be robust to the fact that qualities of other sensors are not perfectly known, each sensor may end up building enough trust with more than one other sensor in the long run, and go back and forth between them infinitely often along any given sample path. However, there are conditions under which one can restrict attention to the set of deterministic policies without any loss. Below,
we present on such sufficient condition.
Proposition 7 (Deterministic Communication). Suppose that at period t for all j ∈ N \ {i} we have Vj ≤ s.t. V j for somej ∈ N \ {i}. Then π * it defined in (23) prescribes that sensor i targets sensorj at period t almost surely regardless of .
Proposition 7 establishes a connection between cases with unknown qualities and those with known qualities. When qualities are known, sensor i targets the sensor that provides the lowest signal variance, i.e., the most informative signal. When qualities are unknown, this deterministic comparison has a stochastic counterpart: if the signal variance from one sensorj is stochastically lower than that of other sensors, sensor i targets sensorj with probability one, regardless of the optimism level, . Thus, sensor i still behaves deterministically for any robustness level imposed by . However, this deterministic behavior may not hold if sensor i assigns probabilities to unknown qualities in a way that no one sensor's signal variance stochastically dominates the others.
Next, we numerically explore how the tradeoffs we observed in our earlier results and experiments between (a) quality, (b) trust, and (c) state can be affected by the underlying ambiguity around qualities and/or by the level of optimism of sensors. 17 In both of the following studies (Studies 3 and 4 below), we assume that a collection of three sensors operates in an environment where the underlying AR(1) model has parameters (α, β) = (2, 0.7). We assume that sensor i = j believes that sensor j's quality lies in the range (0, 2q j ) with all values in this range equally likely and where q (q j : j ∈ N ) = (9.8, 9.6., 9.4). Thus, the average perceived quality and ambiguity range both decrease in the sensor label, such that Sensor 1 (3) has both the highest (lowest) maximum possible quality and the highest (lowest) average perceived quality. That is, while a higher-label sensor is perceived to have a higher quality on average, a lower-label sensor's quality is known with less ambiguity. In what follows, the known-quality counterpart problem sets the qualities at the exact q j values given by q (q j : j ∈ N ) = (9.8, 9.6., 9.4), which is (a) similar to values used in our earlier studies, and (b) corresponds to the average perceived qualities in the unknown-quality case.
Study 3 (Common Initial Trusts) In this study, we assume initial trust values are common among sensors (set at v ij0 = w ij0 = 2), and compare the cases of known and unknown qualities. For the case of known qualities, we analytically established earlier that target selection is deterministic (i.e., sample path independent) and time-invariant in the case of common initial trusts (see earlier Special Case 1): the highest-quality sensor targets the second-highest quality sensor, all other sensors target the highest quality sensor. This is illustrated in Figure 4 (a) in which the link value is 1 on 1 → 2; 2 → 1; and 3 → 1. The long run trustee may not be deterministic, however, when qualities are unknown; see, e.g., Figure 4 (b) which presents the long run communication network
for an optimism parameter of = 0.2.
Observe from the link values that in the long run each sensor typically (but not always) targets 17 We restrict our attention to the set of deterministic policies to gain clear insights, and avoid extra levels of complexities that are caused by randomized policies.
the lowest-label sensor available to it, indicating that each sensor's long run target is more likely to be the one for which the ambiguity is lowest even though such a sensor's average perceived quality is the lowest. However, this preference towards lower ambiguity (which comes at the cost of targeting a lower average quality sensor) is violated on some sample paths. A value of = 0.2 implies that sensors are quite pessimistic (i.e., ambiguity-averse) in target selection, and hence they put a lot of weight on avoiding targeting a potentially low-quality sensor. Given our construction of the ambiguity sets, lower-label sensors have lower likelihoods of low quality values, and that is why sensors tend to target low-label sensors. However, because there is some chance that the lower label sensor may be the one with the lower quality (e.g., higher labeled sensors have a higher maximum possible quality), we observe that this long run low-label selection does not occur along all sample paths.
Study 4 (The Effect of the Optimism Level): We now explore the impact of the optimism parameter on long run target selection. We consider a setting where initial trusts vary across sensors. In particular, we use the same initial trust matrix as used in our earlier known-quality studies; see (22) . Therefore, the study replicates the known-quality instance in Figure 2 (f) except that there is now quality ambiguity; sensors can't assume that qualities are exactly at their means as was the case with known qualities. ate observation is that the link probabilities differ when qualities are unknown. This is because target selection now must consider ambiguities in addition to qualities and trusts. Moreover, we observe that the optimism parameter strongly influences long run target selection. Sensors are more pessimistic (optimistic) about potential sensor qualities when is low (high) and this in turn influences the emphasis placed on trust versus possible qualities, which in turn influences the role of state in target selection. The optimism parameter used by a sensor will depend on the firm that deployed it. Thus, our results imply that organizational attitudes towards ambiguity will impact target selection and the resulting communication network that evolves over time.
Combining findings from this study and those presented earlier, we see that the inherent targeting trade-off between quality and trust is influenced by both the environment (through the state dynamics) and the firms deploying the sensors (through the ambiguity optimism parameter). 
Extensions
In the appendices we analyze three extensions to the base model: (i) delayed state realization or no state realization; (ii) non-myopic target selection; and (iii) inference model parameter updating.
Here, we briefly summarize the key results for those extensions.
If state realization is delayed (i.e., the state is only realized after some general time lag greater than one) or there is no state realization (i.e., the state is never realized), then we find that the following key results still hold: if sensor qualities are asymmetric then (i) there exists a unique (albeit sample-path dependent) long run trustee; (ii) this trustee can be determined in finite time; and (iii) there exists a finite time after which the long run communication network can be defined as a deterministic directed graph. That is, Propositions 4, 5, and 6 all continue to hold; see Propositions EC.1, EC.2, and EC.3 in Appendix B for details (and their proofs in Appendix E).
The setting in which sensors care about the quality of future estimates and not just the current period estimate is analyzed in Appendix C. We establish that this nonmyopic problem lies in the general class of restless multi-armed bandit problems. Nonetheless, we show that if the discount factor (for future estimates) is below a certain threshold then it is optimal for sensors to act myopically. For any arbitrary discount factor, we also establish a sufficient condition for myopic targeting to be optimal in a given state. The development and formal statements of these results can be found in Appendix C, and their related proofs are provided in Appendix E.
In Appendix D, we allow sensors to update their own inference parameters in a Bayesian fashion.
We formally establish that if each sensor's initial belief precision exceeds a certain threshold (and this is publicly known) then inference parameter updating will not alter the target selection of any of the sensors. This implies that if pre-deployment training data sets are large enough to result in sufficiently high initial precisions then network formation among sensors can be accurately studied Article submitted to ; manuscript no.
without assuming that sensors update their inference models after deployment. Since in practice firms typically use large amount of training data pre-deployment, this highlights the importance of studying the setting we considered earlier.
Conclusions
Much of the promise of the IoT stems from the idea that better operational decisions will be enabled by a vast array of sensors that provide almost real-time knowledge of the state of things. This knowledge will often be imperfect due to the inherent precision limitations of sensors. Information fusion, in particular the sharing of estimates across sensors, can help improve estimation quality.
However, sensors cannot necessarily solicit information from all other sensors due to cost and technical considerations; they may be limited in their number of targets at any given instant.
We characterize the initial and long run communication network-who talks to who-for an arbitrary collection of sensors that do not know each others' underlying inference models and that may not know each others' qualities. We establish that the state of the environment plays a key role in determining the weights placed on quality and trust (knowledge of another's inference model)
when selecting a target. We establish that if sensors differ in their qualities then each sensor will eventually target a single sensor in all future periods. This long run target, however, can vary by sensor and is sample-path dependent because state values influence the weight sensors put on trust versus quality. We establish that the long run communication network that forms between sensors can be fully defined at time zero as a random directed graph and that one can probabilistically predict the long-run communication patterns that will emerge. When qualities are not common knowledge, we show that a firm's ambiguity attitude can play an important role in target selection.
Our work sheds light on what kind of communication networks develop over time, and this enables managers to not only make predictions about which other firms their sensors will interact with but to also influence the communication outcomes through the levers of sensor qualities and initial trusts. This predictive ability and managerial control is important in light of the fact that sensor communications build organizational ties that require attention and resources.
This specific research could be extended in a number of directions. For example, the sensors might not operate in the same environment but instead operate in correlated environments such that signals are still somewhat informative to each other. Also, the environment might evolve according to a more general model than the AR (1) model we used to generate insights. Because the goal of this research was not to examine a highly specific application but rather to establish and analyze a general information-quality communication framework that applies to a broad range of emerging IoT settings, we were intentionally silent about both (a) the actions of the sensorowning entities; we made the mild assumption that better estimation allows better actions, and hence, sensors have the objective of providing their entities with the best estimates; and (b) the incentives of these entities for sharing information; we assumed a particular partial-information sharing regime in which the entities only share state estimates but not their proprietary inner processes (e.g., inference models, readings, etc.). Moving beyond the specifics of this research, there is a rich set of action-and incentive-related research questions within IoT that merit future research but may require somewhat different models. Additionally, we have focused on the information quality motive for sensor communication but firms are also interested in information completeness in which the states of distinct elements are combined to provide an overall system state. In general, the IoT presents many opportunities to explore how to improve and exploit information quality and information completeness in various operations related domains. We hope our study motivates further research in this area.
